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Technology Dynamics and Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Mitigation: A Cost Assessment 
R. ALEXANDER ROEHRL and KEYWAN RIAHI 
ABSTRACT 
This article analyzes long-term greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and their mitigation in a family of high 
economic and energy demand growth scenarios in which technological change unfolds in alternative '"path 
dependent .. directions. Four variants of this family are developed and used as baseline scenarios. for which 
alternati,·e policy cases leading to a stabilization of atmospheric CO, concentrations at 450. 550. 650. and 750 
parts per million by rnlume (ppmv) by the end of the 21st century are examined. The baseline scenarios share 
common demographic. economic. and energy demand deYelopments. but explore alternative development 
pathways of technological change and resource a\·ailability. We illustrate the sensitivity of projected future 
G HG emission levels and resulting global climate change to alternative developments in energy systems 
technologies. We conclude that uncertainties in technological change are as important for determining future 
G HG emissions as uncertainties in long-term demographic and economic developments. We also illustrate 
that diff.:rences in costs between alternative baseline scenarios of technological change may be larger than 
th.: cost differences of reaching alternative environmental (climate change stabilization) targets. Under our 
assumptions of high economic and energy demand gro,,·th. e,·en in scenarios favoring fossil fuels. the long-
term technology portfolio needs to include improvements in zero-carbon technologies and gas-related technolo-
gies and infrastructures. We suggest that impro,·emcnts in these technology options are a robust hedging 
strategy for an uncertain energy future. © 2000 Else,·icr Science Inc. 
Introduction 
The possibility of human-induced climate change raises a number of formidable 
analytical and policy challenges. Foremost among these challenges is the time scale of 
a century or more that is characteristic for interactions between human activities like 
energy production and use. resulting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, changes in the 
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and their influence on changes in the radiative 
balance of the planet and. hence. climate change and its impacts. The nature of these 
interactions are highly uncertain. Yet, to understand the possible magnitude of the 
problem and likely consequences on society and nature. it is necessary to explore the 
very long term-a century. in the case of the calculations reported here. Uncertainties 
in long-term demographic and economic developments have been explored in numerous 
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scenario studies of GHG emissions (for a review see, e.g., [1]). Conversely, uncertainties 
in technological developments have-with notable exceptions-so far received less 
attention. Frequently, scenario studies embrace an incrementalist view of future technol-
ogy and anticipate no radical changes. The major mechanism of technological change 
is the assumed progressive depletion of conventional oil and gas resources, which in 
most scenario studies triggers a massive return to coal and, hence. a high GHG emission 
(and climate change) future (for a discussion see [2] and [3]). In this article we illustrate 
that uncertainties in technological developments appear as important as uncertainties 
in demographic and economic developments in terms of their influence on future 
GHG emissions. 
This article presents one part of collaborative work undertaken by an international 
team of researchers to explore the uncertainties inherent in projecting GHG emissions 
over the next century (see Nakicenovic's Introduction to this issue). In this article we 
illustrate how the large uncertainties of alternative developments in technology translate 
into a wide range of future GHG emission levels, which in turn result in different 
climate change impacts. To this end. we explore possible multiple pathways of technolog-
ical change within one scenario family. the high growth cases of the Al scenario. We 
then explore the feasibility and costs of policy scenarios that meet the stated objective 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of "stabilization 
of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system" [4]. Because at present scientific 
uncertainty is very great regarding what exact level constitutes a "dangerous interference 
with the climate system," calculations are reported for a range of alternative C02 
concentration stabilization targets at 750, 650, 550. and 450 ppmv. We conclude with a 
discussion of analytical and policy implications of our analysis. 
The most distinguishing feature of the Al (also labeled ''High Growth") scenario 
family (see also Morita et al. in this issue) is that the scenario explores a future in which 
present development gaps between "rich'' and "poor" (or between the developed and 
the developing countries) largely disappear. This (normative) scenario assumption was 
made in response to the critique that the earlier Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) scenarios insufficiently explored this possibility and, hence, were "un-
fair" to the South [5]. The 1994 evaluation of the IPCC IS92 long-term GHG emission 
scenario series also concluded on the need to "explore a variety of economic develop-
ment pathways. for example. a closing of the income gap between industrialized and 
developing regions" [I]. Consistent with both historical evidence as well as growth 
theory, income growth and a reduction of per capita income differences basically imply 
growth in productivity and equalization of productivity differences across different 
economies in which technological change (along with education and institutional factors) 
plays a central role (for a review of historical evidence see, e.g., [6]; for recent cross-
country evidence see, e.g., [7] ; for a review of growth theory see, e.g., [8]). Consistent 
with the observation that technological change is crucial for productivity growth, high 
rates of technological change are explored in the scenario family Al that is characterized 
by high (macroeconomic) productivity growth. 
The systemic and cumulative nature of technological change lead to clustering 
effects (technological interdependence) and possible phenomena of increasing returns 
(i.e .. the more a technology is applied the more it improves and widens its market 
potentials). Combined. they explain both the pervasive impacts of technological change, 
once implemented, but also the considerable inertia to implement change due to "lock-
in" effects (9. 10] . Related concepts of path dependency (change goes in a persistent 
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direction based on an accumulation of past decisions) help to explain the intriguing 
stability of technological change trajectories at the macro level (see, e.g., [11 , 12, 13]). 
As a result. technological change can go in multiple directions . but once change is 
initiated in a particular direction, it becomes increasingly difficult to change its course. 
Research development and demonstration (RD&D) as well as investment decisions in 
the energy sector over the next two to three decades are consequently critical in de-
termining which longer-term technological options in the energy sector may be opened, 
or which ones may be foreclosed [14] . The scenarios reported here illustrate such 
alternative technology futures of the energy sector due to alternative technology and 
resource development strategies. 
Four variants of the Al scenario family are presented in this paper. They were 
created with the MESSAGE energy systems model at the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (II ASA) . Huge energy demands and large uncertainties about 
future technology use and technology dynamics. lead to a potentially large range of 
CO, emissions from 5 to 34 GtC in 2100, and CO, concentrations of 560 to 950 ppm 
in 2100. Varying the technology assumptions within the High Growth Al scenario family 
in fact translates into a range of future CO, emissions as large as the range spanned 
by the literature C02 emissions presented in Kram et al. (in this issue). which explore 
additional uncertainties in demographics. economy. and environmental policy. In other 
words, decisions that could lead the global energy system into alternative directions , 
e .g .. either to a massive return to coal or. alternatively, on a pathway of continued 
'"decarbonization .. [2]. matter as much as decisions on a particular long-term climate 
policy target. for example, in the form of C02 concentration stabilization levels. 
The remainder of this article is as follows: The following section describes common-
alities and differences between the four A 1 baseline scenarios. They share similar energy 
demand and economic and population developments. but differ mainly in assumptions 
on technology dynamics and resource availability. This highlights, in particular, differ-
ences of C02 stabilization costs as a function of baseline uncertainties. The baseline 
scenarios include a coal intensive scenario (A 1 C). an oil and gas intensive scenario 
(AIG). a '"balanced'" scenario with technological progress across the board (AlB). and 
a rapid technological change scenario toward post-fossil alternatives (Al T). The section 
also includes a note on how we deal with technological progress in the energy systems 
model. A later section. Atmospheric C02 Stabilization Cases of the Four Al Baselines, 
describes the results of developing 450. 550, 650. and 750ppm atmospheric C0 2 stabiliza-
tion cases from these four baselines. The final section presents conclusions and policy 
implications from our analysis. 
A Set of High Growth Al Baseline Scenarios 
The Al scenario family describes a case of rapid and successful economic develop-
ment. in which regional differences in per capita incomes gradually disappear over the 
next century, making current distinctions between "poor" and "rich" regions largely 
obsolete. By and large , the Al scenario implies a replication of the post-war growth 
experience of Japan and South Korea or the recent economic development of China 
on a global scale (see Appendix for a qualitative description of the scenario's "storyline" 
developed by the writing team). A replication of the most successful historical examples 
of industrialization and narrowing of income gaps on a global scale is without historical 
precedent. The resulting scenario may be considered as daring, or "unrealistic," by 
many. Yet. its implied high rates of macroeconomic productivity growth make it an 
ideal basis to explore high rates of technological change in the energy sector leading 
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TABLE 1 
O•·er•·iew of Main Commonalities in Scenario Drh·ers and Results of the Four Al Baseline Scenarios 
Created with the MESSAGE Model (See ( 15 J; and Riahi and Roehrl in this issue) 
Commonalities of A 1 baseline scenarios 
(AIB. AIG. AJC and AIT) 
Population in billions 
Economic growth gross world product 
(GWP) (at market exchange rates) 
Per cap ita income. G\VP/cap in US$/GDP 
(at market exchange rates) 
Final energy use (annual) 
Land-use change" 
Low 
IIASA (16] 
Results 
8.7 billion by 2050 and 7.1 billion by 2100 
Very high 
1990--2020: 3.3% 
1990--2050: 3.7% 
1990-2100: 3.0% 
Very high 
In 2100: US$ 109.500 in Annex I. US$ 
69.800 in Non-Annex I 
High 
Increase from 275 EJ in 1990 to 
1.743-1.769 
EJ by 2100 for AIB. AIG and AIC. 
1.270 EJ in AIT by 2100. 
Low 
1990--2100: -3% of cropland, +6% 
grasslands and -2% of forest area 
Notes: The classification (low. high. ,·ery high) is taken relative to the scenario literature. Differences in 
scenario drivers and results of the four A I baselines are summarized in Table 2. 
"Land-use data for the IIASA runs taken from All\! Al land-use emulation runs. 
to massive long-term structural changes in alternative directions and. hence, of techno-
logical uncertainty on future GHG emissions. 
Four of these alternative pathways. according to different resource and technology 
development assumptions. are presented here as A 1 baseline scenarios: 
• AlC: "Clean coal" technologies that are generally environmentally friendly with 
the exception of GHG emissions: 
• AlG: "Oil and gas"-rich future. with a swift trans1t1on from conventional re-
sources to abundant unconventional resources including methane clathrates: 
• A 1 T: "Post-fossil" future. with rapid development of solar and new nuclear 
technologies on the supply side. and mini-turbines and fuel cells used in energy 
end-use applications: 
• A 1 B: "Balanced technology" future. exploring a combination of developments 
of the AlC. AlG and AlT scenario variants; the scenario assumes "balanced" 
progress across all resources and technologies from energy supply to end use. 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize commonalities and differences between these four base-
line scenarios. These are described in more detail in the following sections. They show 
an especially large range of GHG emissions. This range is of the same order of magnitude 
as the range spanned by all the new scenarios illustrated in this issue which explore 
other salient long-term uncertainties in demographics, economics, and environmental 
policy. Combined, the scenarios illustrate the large uncertainties of scenario baselines. 
They also illustrate the fact that similar GHG emission levels may be reached with 
very different combinations of input assumptions. Conversely, possible environmental 
burdens (such as climate change impacts and regional acidification) in the high growth 
TABLE 2 
Overview of Main Differences in Scenario Drivers and lksults of the four Al Baselines Created with the MESSAGE Model (Sec Riahi, Rochrl in this issue; and 1151) 
Al 13 
AIG 
AIC 
AIT 
Marker 
scenario 
range 
Cumulative 
hydrocarbon 
resource use 
(1990- 2100) 
Oil: Medium . 25.4 ZJ 
Gas: lligh. 31.3 ZJ 
Coal: Low. 19.7 ZJ 
Oil: 1 ligh . 34.5 ZJ 
Gas: Very high . 50.3 ZJ 
Coal: Low. 19.8 ZJ 
Oil: Medium. 18.5 ZJ 
Gas: Medium. 20.5 ZJ 
Coal: Very high. 48.4 ZJ 
Oil: Medium. 20.8 ZJ 
Gas: Medium, 25.0 ZJ 
Coal: Very Low, 11 .7 ZJ 
Oil: 16.1 - 19.5 ZJ 
Gas: 14.6-36. 1 ZJ 
Cerni: 12.2-38.6 ZJ 
Coal 
lligh 
Low 
High 
Low 
Technology imrrovements 
Oil Gas 
High High 
Very Very 
high high 
Low Low 
High High 
Non fossil 
High 
Median 
Low 
Very 
high 
Primary energy 
use 
(by 2100) 
Very high. 2.681 EJ 
Low energy intensity 
of 4.9 MJ/US$ 
Very high. 2.715 EJ 
Low energy intensity 
of 4.9 MJ/US$ 
High. 2J25 EJ 
Low energy intensity 
of 4.2 MJ/US$ 
High. 2.021 EJ 
V cry low energy 
intensity of 3.7 
MJ/US$ 
551-2079 EJ. 
2.<l-7.1 MJ/US$ 
Emissions (by 2100) 
CO," 
Median. 14.0 GtC 
Cumulative ( 1990-
2100): 1.517 GtC 
High. 27.7 GtC 
Cumulative ( 1990-
2100): 1.872 GtC 
High. 32.7 GtC 
Cumulative ( 1990-
2100): 1.999 GtC 
Low. 4.9 GtC 
Cumulative (1990-
2100): 1.076 GtC 
5.7-29.1 GtC 
CH, 
Medium 
351 MtCH, 
High 
421 MtCH, 
Very high 
668MtCH, 
Low 
269 MtCH, 
236-889 
Mt CH, 
so, 
Low 
29.1 MtS 
Medium 
38.4 MtS 
Peak in 
2040: 129 
MtS, 
declining to 
46.8 MtS 
by 2100 
Very low 
17.2 MtS 
25.9-603 
MtS 
Notes: The classification (low. medium, high. very high) reviews technology dynamics across the MESSAGE-A I baseline scenarios relative to the scenario literature. A summary 
of technology imrrovements for extraction, distribution, and conversion technologies assumed for the Al baseline scenarios is also included. The "marker scenario range" 
illustrates the range of the 82 (Riahi and Roehr!, in this issue), Al (Morita ct al. in this issue). 131 (de Vries ct al., in this issue) and A2 (Sankovski et al., in this issue) scenarios 
described in this issue which are very different in terms of economic, demographic and technological assumptions. 
"CO, emissions from fossil fuels and industrial processes. 
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Al world might range from disastrous to relatively benign, depending essentially on 
rates and directions of technological change. 
COMMONALITIES: !-'OPULA TION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
RESULTING ENERGY DEMAND 
In the A 1 scenario family, demographic and economic trends are closely linked. 
as affluence is correlated with long life and small families (low mortality and low 
fertility). The population trajectory assumed is based on a variant of the low population 
projection reported by Lutz et al. (16, 17]. combining low fertility with low mortality 
and central migration rate assumptions. After peaking at 8.7 billion in the middle of 
the next century. world population declines to 7.1 billion in the year 2100 (see Table 
1 ). The assumption of below-replacement fertility levels results also in a significant 
population aging, which in the long-term affects all world regions. 
The scenario family Al explores a world in which future economic development 
follows the patterns of the most successful historical examples of economic development 
catch-up. Free trade. continued innovation. and a stable political and social climate 
enable developing regions to access knowledge, technology. and capital. The global 
economy is projected to expand at an average annual rate of 3% to 2100 (see Table 
1). roughly in line with historical experience over the last 100 years (18]. The 3% per 
year economic growth rate translates into a 26-fold expansion of global economic output1 
that would reach US$550 trillion by 2100. As a byproduct of rapid economic development 
and a fast demographic transition. income inequities between Annex I and non-Annex 
I countries~ are reduced to almost zero. Per capita income ratios would be 1: 1.6 in 2100. 
compared to a ratio of 1:16 in 1990. Per capita income in Annex I increases to about 
US$109.000, and in non-Annex I countries to US$70.000. By and large. the Al scenario 
implies a replication of the post-war experience of Japan and South Korea, or the recent 
economic development of China across all developing regions. 
Other commonalities of all Al variants are relatively high energy demand (see 
Table I). moderated. however. by continuous structural change and the diffusion of 
more efficient technologies, consistent with the high productivity growth and capital 
turnover rates. In the AlB. AlC. and AIG scenario, improvements in energy efficiency 
on the demand side are assumed to be roughly in line with historical experience. 
These improvements may be considered to be relatively low compared to more "green" 
scenarios (see. e.g .. the Bl scenario in de Vries et al. in this issue). Low energy prices 
provide little incentive to improve end-use energy efficiencies, and high income levels 
encourage comfortable and convenient (often energy-intensive) lifestyles. Efficient tech-
nologies are not fully introduced into the end-use side. However, the Al T scenario 
explores some of the consequences of an increased final to end-use efficiency. All Al 
variants. however. share a similar demand for energy services. 
MULTIPLE BRANCHING IN TECHNOLOGY DYNAMICS AND 
RESOURCE AVAILABILITY 
Figure 1 illustrates the change of world primary energy structure over time. The 
historical change reflects major technology shifts, from traditional use of renewable 
' Throughout this article . GDP and GDP-related numbers are presented at market exchange rates and 
in llJlJO US$. 
' The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the FCCC lists developed countries in .. Annex 1.·· All other countries are 
referred to as Non-Annex I countries. 
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Coal 
Shares in 
Primary 
Energy 
_ . _ . _ . lsoshare 
Oil/Gas 
1
1 lsoshare 
I 0-carbon 
\
lsoshare 
Coal 
20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
Renewables/Nuclear 
Fig. 1. Global shares in primar~· energ~· use, coal, oil/gas and nonfossil energy, illustrated with an 
"energy triangle"' (in percent). Constant market shares of coal, oil/gas, and nonfossil (zero-carbon) 
energies arc denoted by their respectin isosharc lines. Historical data from 1850 to 1990 arc based on 
I 141. For the years 1990-2100, alternati,·e trajectories for the four A 1 scenario ,·ariants, A IB, A IT, 
AIG, and AlC unfold. For comparison, the IS92 scenario scril's arc also shown, clustering along two 
trajectories (IS92c,d and IS92a,b,e,f respecti,·ely). Bullets on the 1990-2100 trajectories represent 10-
)'l'ar time steps. 
energy flows to the coal and steam age of the 19th century' to the dominance of oil 
and internal combustion engines in the 20th century. Around 1850, only about 20% of 
world primary energy was provided by coal. the other 80% was provided by traditional 
renewable energies (biomass. direct wind and hydropower. and animal and human 
energy). With the rise of industrialization. coal substituted for traditional renewable 
energy forms , and by 1920. around three-quarters of world primary energy use relied 
on coal. The second major transition was the replacement of coal by oil and later by 
gas . By the early 1970s. 56% of global primary energy use was based on oil and gas. 
Since then, the global primary energy structure has changed little , efforts to substitute 
for oil imports have led to a certain revival of coal and to the introduction of non fossil 
alternatives in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
' With a resulting dominance of coal. peaking around tbe I 920s. 
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countries (e.g., nuclear energy in France). Rapid growth in energy demand and coal use , 
particularly in Asia, have outweighed energy structural changes in the OECD countries. 
Alternative , possible future evolutions of the global primary energy structure• from 
1990 to 2100 are illustrated with the four Al baseline scenarios. For these scenarios. 
we assume technological change in energy conversion and supply technologies to be 
strongly interrelated. Therefore, resource availability in each of the scenarios depends 
on the alternative investment strategies into exploration, production, and conversion 
technologies.5 These result in alternative transition strategies away from conventional 
oil and gas [including the AlG scenario in which the large geological occurrences of 
unconventional oil and gas (for a review see [19]) can be tapped]. Figure 1 illustrates 
this multiple branching in the evolution of global primary energy structures of the 
different Al baseline scenarios from 1990 to 2100. AIB, and even more so, AlT, follow 
a trend toward increasing shares of zero-carbon options in the long term. AIG more 
or less follows an oil/gas isoshare line, perpetuating the current dominance of oil and 
gas in the global energy balance far into the 21st century. Al C indicates a near doubling 
of coal's share in primary energy use. This evolution is path dependent. In the section 
on Atmospheric C02 Stabilization Cases. the four Al scenario variants are used as 
baselines for discussing C02 abatement costs for meeting alternative long-term climate 
change stabilization targets. 
The following five sections describe resource availability and technology improve-
ment assumptions that define the four different A I baselines in more detail. 
Coal-lntemive Baseline-Al C 
The high growth, coal-intensive scenario AIC illustrates the long-term GHG emis-
sion implications of quickly "running out of conventional oil and gas'' combined with 
slow progress in developing alternatives. except for progress in coal-related technologies. 
It assumes relatively high cost improvements in new and clean coal technologies such 
as coal high-temperature fuel cells, integrated coal gasification combined cycle power 
plants (IGCC) and coal liquefaction. Only modest assumptions are made for all other 
technologies. except for nuclear technologies (including uranium extraction technolo-
gies). which in the AlC scenario are significantly developed towards the end of the 21st 
century, when zero-carbon options are needed to ease the resource and environmental 
constraints of a coal-intensive economy. In terms of resource assumptions, AIC is 
restricted mainly to availability of currently assessed quantities of conventional oil and 
gas which results in the low cumulative oil and gas use of 39 ZJ (I ZJ is 1021 Joules.) 
and very high cumulative coal use of 48 ZJ between 1990 and 2100 (see Table 2). 
Whereas final energy use in AlC is similar to that of AlB and AlG, total primary 
energy is lower since AlC makes use of advanced clean coal technologies, such as coal 
high temperature fuel cells with very high efficiencies. In 2100, the main primary energy 
'In this article. we adopt as primary energy accounting methodology the direct equivalent method for 
all nonthermal uses of renewables and nuclear. For instance. the primary energy equivalence of electricity 
generated from solar photovoltaics or nuclear power plants is set equal to their respective gross electricity 
output and 1101 the heat equivalent of radiation energy from fissile reaction. the solar radiance falling onto a 
photovoltaic panel and converted to electricity (with efficiencies ranging from 10 to 15%). or the heat that 
would have to be generated by the burning of fossil fuels to produce the same amount of electricity as generated 
in a photovoltaic cell or a nuclear reactor (which would be the so-called "substitution·· accounting method). 
; As outlined in the section Representation of Technological Progress on the MESSAGE model. time 
profiles of costs of energy conversion and supply technologies are direct input assumptions. Reserves/resources 
are split in different cost categories following [ 19] . In other words. we chose consistent resource and technology 
assumptions. they are not output of the model. 
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carrier is coal which has a share of 1.084 EJ (47%), but all of that coal is converted to 
high quality fuels demanded by the affluent consumers of the 21st century. Demand 
for coal is so large that some world regions run out of coal. whereas large coal occurrences 
remain available in the former Soviet Union, North America. and to some extent, China. 
Therefore, a large-scale global methanol trade unfolds. In 2100, the transport sector, 
for example, depends on methanol produced from coal for 64 % of its energy use. Some 
coal-poor regions try to rely increasingly on nuclear technologies to ease their import 
dependence. On the global level, this leads to an important share of nuclear6 (18%) in 
the primary energy supply. Thus, even assuming that technological change unfolds in 
the direction of "clean coal" technologies, coal remains more of a regional fuel that 
needs to be complemented by alternatives. 
Oil- and Gas-Intensive Baseline-Al G 
The high growth oil and gas-intensive scenario Al G illustrates long-term GHG 
emissions under the assumption of rapid technological progress for extraction and 
conversion technologies of oil and gas (conventional and unconventional). In addition 
to the improvement and extension of present oil and gas grids and transportation/ 
distribution infrastructure. new natural gas pipelines from Siberia, the Caspian, and the 
Middle East to China. Korea , Japan. and South Asia (India) are introduced in the 
scenario after 2010/2020 [20].7 It is assumed that extraction and refining technologies 
for oil and gas experience rapid improvements so that the extraction of natural gas 
hydrates and of unconventional oil like oilshales or natural bitumen (tarsands) becomes 
economically feasible on a large scale beyond current niche market applications (Canada 
and Venezuela). This leads to a world dominated first by oil and later by gas as primary 
energy fuels. Since unconventional oil and gas resources are distributed unevenly over 
world regions. there is large-scale gas and oil trade, mainly from the former Soviet 
Union and the Middle East. Cumulative oil and gas extraction from 1990 to 2100 
amounts to 85 ZJ (see Table 2), about twice as high as in A 1 C. A 1 G reflects current 
perceptions that radical technological change would need to occur in order to translate 
a more significant portion of the geological resource base of unconventional oil and 
gas into technically and economically recoverable reserves. a development evidently 
also cross-checked by possible developments in nonfossil alternatives. Although there 
is less conversion than in the other A 1 scenarios. and final energy demand is of the 
same magnitude as that of A 1B and A 1 C. world primary energy use in Al G is high 
because of additional energy requirements for the extraction of shale oil and methane 
clathrates and for gas transport over continental distances. Because of large capital 
turnover rates in AlG. primary energy needs per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) 
improve somewhat faster than the historical experience. The main primary energy 
carriers in 2100 are natural gas (45%). oil (14%), nuclear (12%). and renewables (25%). 
Again. as was the case in the A 1 C scenario reported above, nonfossil alternatives 
supplement the oil and gas intensive energy menu of the AlG scenario due to the 
uneven distribution of conventional and unconventional oil and gas resources. 
' Here and thereafter when we refer to ··nuclear .. we assume possible new generations of inherently safe 
nuclear reactors. These may be rclati\'ely small size. and highly standardized types. Due to large political 
uncertainties of societies' acceptance of future nuclear technologies. however. the category "nuclear .. in our 
sce narios may be regarded as a placeholder for other future zero-carbon electricity base load technologies. 
' Initial financing requirements for such a Russian gas grid might be eased by global CO, trading under 
the 1997 Kyoto protocol. which might generate annual financial inflows of US$15-$20 billion to Russia. 
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Rapid Technology Change, Post-Fossil Baseline-Al T 
The high growth "post-fossil" Al T baseline explores long-term GHG emissions in 
case of very rapid technological change for nonfossil alternatives. Large-scale and tar-
geted RD&D investments are a prerequisite for such a scenario. Al T, for instance. 
would imply the large-scale installation of new, inherently safe and cheap nuclear 
technologies (e.g., high temperature reactors) and new renewable technologies. Another 
difference to the other three Al baselines is that Al T explores further final to end-use 
efficiency improvements resulting in the same useful energy but lower final energy (1270 
EJ in 2100, see Table 18). AlT assumes medium levels of resource availability for oil and 
gas (90 ZJ). However, because of fast technological progress in post-fossil alternatives. 
cumulative oil and gas extraction (46 ZJ) and coal extraction (12 ZJ) from 1990 to 2100 
remain small in comparison to the other scenario variants. In 2100, the main primary 
energy carriers are renewables and nuclear (86% ). and natural gas 196 EJ (10% ). The 
shift toward carbon-free and also decentralized technologies is nearly complete in all 
world regions by 2100. 
"Balanced Technology" Baseline-Al B 
The high growth '"balanced technology" A 1 B baseline explores ''balanced" progress 
across all resources and technologies from energy supply to end use. Investment costs 
for electricity generation with solar photovoltaic decrease by a factor of more than ten. 
those for fuel cells. hydrogen, and wind technologies by a factor of two to five , and 
those of new nuclear technologies by a factor of one to three. Liquid fuels from coal 
or unconventional oil/gas resources become available at less than US$30 per barrel. 
with costs falling further by about I% per year with exploitation of learning curve 
effects. Nonfossil electricity (photovoltaics. new nuclear) become available at costs of 
less than 10 mills/kWh (0.01$/kWh). and continue to improve further (perhaps as low 
as 1 mills/kWh) . Energy resources are taken to be plentiful by assuming large reserves 
of unconventional oil and gas. and high levels of improvement in the efficiency of energy 
exploitation technologies, energy conversion technologies. and transport technologies . 
This results in initially large hydrocarbon use (see Table 2). which is later increasingly 
substituted by zero-carbon options. Contrary to the other scenario variants in which 
technological change in the energy sector is largely " path dependent." the AlB scenario 
variant presupposes some sort of coordination mechanism in technology RD&D 
allowing regions/countries to specialize in the development of alternative technology 
clusters (e.g .. "clean coal." nuclear, or renewables) and their subsequent effective diffu-
sion and transfer at the international level. 
Representation of Technological Progress in MESSAGE 
As outlined in the last sections, the A 1 baseline scenarios mainly differ in their 
assumptions on technological progress. This section summarizes how processes like 
technological learning are taken into account in the MESSAGE model (version IV, 
see also (15]: and Riahi and Roehr! in this issue. pp. 175-205) used to quantify the 
scenarios described in this article. The evolution of technological knowledge is among 
' The increased final to end-use efficiency in Al T as compared to the other At baselines is a consequence 
of the assumption of rapid technological change in AlT. AlT experiences a shift to radically different energy 
conversion technologies as compared to today. These provide high q11aliry fuels such as electricity and H2 on 
the tinal energy level. Conversion from final energy to end-use energy services is. therefore. possible with very 
high efficiencies (e.g .. with H, fuel cells). Furthermore the use of the direct equivalent method (see footnote 
I) increases the final to end-use efficiency further because of the use of decentralized technologies such as 
decentralized solar thermal technologies in the residential sector. 
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the main drivers of long-term productivity and economic growth [18]. Over long time 
horizons, performance of technologies is considerably improved (efficiencies increased, 
unit costs reduced, etc.) and new technologies are introduced. 
MESSAGE IV is a linear programming model (LP) of the global energy systems 
model operating on 11 world regions. It minimizes total discounted system costs for 
1990-2100. For the scenarios featured in this article, technical, economic and environ-
mental parameters for over 400 energy technologies (out of a set of 1,600 in the C02DB 
database [21]) are specified explicitly in the model. Technological learning is a classical 
example of increasing returns; that is, the more experience accumulated by organizations 
and individuals. the better the performance and the lower the costs of a technology. 
Unit costs typically decrease exponentially as experience (measured as a function of 
cumulative output) is gained. This decay reflects that learning itself shows decreasing 
marginal returns. Learning curves are characterized by a single learning rate and initial 
unit costs. Assuming fixed learning rates ex ante in the model formulation is, however, 
not possible within an LP formulation, because it is a nonconvex problem which has 
to be tackled , for example. with Mixed Integer Programming (MIP). Illustrative MIP 
versions of MESSAGE to endogenize technological change through uncertain returns 
from research and developent (R&D) and learning have been developed [22], but 
are computationally infeasible for a detailed scenario that includes over 400 energy 
technologies and operates on 11 world regions, as in the A 1 cases here. 
For our purposes, we use an iterative approach here. In MESSAGE IV, we treat 
technology exogenously, that is, performance of technologies improves at predefined 
rates over time. MESSAGE solves for the global minimum of discounted total costs 
for a fixed model time horizon. The assumed time profile of unit costs will, at first, not 
necessarily follow the exponential decay behavior. However, in an iterative fashion , we 
tried to make the ex ante assumed time profiles of cost reductions for new installations 
consistent with the resulting time profiles of cumulative installed capacities (at least for 
major technologies). This approach is made possible with additional dynamic market 
penetration constraints in order for the most important technologies to avoid "flip-flop" 
behavior, and to emulate the initial slow growth in niche markets of newly introduced 
technologies due to upfront investments.9 Figure 2 shows examples of resulting cost 
decrease curves versus cumulative installed capacities in the AlB baseline scenario. 
Since investment costs as a function of cumulative installed capacities follow power 
laws. they appear as straight lines when plotted with logarithmic axis. All in all, Figure 
2 illustrates that in our scenario the unit costs for main technologies follow roughly this 
power law dynamics. 
Compared to historical experience [13], the resulting learning rates in the AIB 
and A 1 T scenarios are on the optimistic end. For example, the learning rate for photovol-
taic power plants in the AlB baseline scenario is nearly 35% , that is, cost reductions 
of 35% per doubling of cumulative installed capacity. This is a learning rate comparable 
to estimated historical learning rates from 1973 to 1995 for photovoltaic cells in Japan 
as reported by Watanabe [23, 24] and somewhat higher than the historical experience 
in the United States and Europe [13]. 
' In reality. initial applications of new technologies in niche markets have the benefit of leading to early 
cost reductions because of learning effects. Our LP model formulation. however. would not .. need .. this initial 
learning as long as additional dynamic market penetration constraints force the model to do early investments 
to be able to install large capacities later. 
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CO, EMISSIONS-Al BASELINES 
As explained above, different technology dynamics in the different Al baseline 
scenarios result in diverging energy supply structures and. hence. a large range of future 
CO, emissions (see Figure 3). This range is comparable to the range of the IPCC IS92 
scenario series [25] that explored mainly the uncertainties in demographic and economic 
developments and paid less attention to technology dynamics [2]. The C01 range of 
the A 1 baselines is also comparable to that of all the scenarios presented in this issue. 
The CO, emission trajectories of the oil and gas-intensive AlG. and the coal-intensive 
A 1 C. exhibit continuously increasing CO, emissions. reaching 28 and 33 GtC. respec-
tively. This is . however, still lower than the CO, emissions of 40 GtC that one would 
expect from a simple extrapolation of the 1990 energy structure in line with the Al 
energy demand increase. AlB and AlT show a different CO, emissions behavior. Due 
to the inertia of the energy system. CO, emissions increase initially, show a peak in the 
middle of the next century, and then start to decline to 14 and 5 GtC, respectively, in 
2100 due to technology-induced structural change. 
We also include. in addition to the dominant energy-sector emissions, C01 emissions 
from industrial sources and land use changes. 10 to estimate resulting atmospheric C01 
concentrations for the four Al baselines (see Figure 4). These were calculated using 
'" Land use emissions were estimated using land use change data from AIM runs of the IPCC SRES Al 
marker scenario. For the purpose of this article. we do not derive different land use change data for all the 
different CO, stabilization cases due to non-availability. In other words. we only analyze CO, abatement 
measures in the energy system. 
TECHNOLOGY DYNAMICS AND EMISSIONS MITIGATION: COST ASSESSMENT 243 
"' c: 
0 
'iii 
"' .E 
w 
0 ~~~-.---~~--.,.-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----; 
1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 
Years 
--+--A1C Baseline 
! ·--·--· A1C750 
....... A1C650 
-·-·--- A1C550 I 
. .. .... A1C450 
-+--A1G Baseline I 
----A1G750 ! 
- - - -A1G650 
----A1G550 
- -- -A1G450 
-+-A1B Baseline ' 
- . - - -A1B650 
--- --A1B550 
i - . - . -A1B450 
: --tt-A 1T Baseline . 
i - .. - . A 1T450 ' I - .. - -A 1T550 . 
Fig. 3. Annual anthropogenic CO, emissions for the four Al scenario baselines. Thin lines indicate 
emissions for alternatin concentration stabilization scenarios calculated on the basis of the four Al 
scenario baselines (in GtC). 
the MAGG IC (Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate Change, 
version 2.3) model [26]. The resulting CO, concentrations in 2100 range from 560 
(522-601) 11 ppmv in AlT, to 724 (670-776) ppmv in AlB, to 891 (825-951) ppmv in 
A1G. to 950 (880-1012) ppmv in AlC (see Figure 4). These atmospheric C02 concentra-
tions are '"best guess" model parameterizations.12 
Atmospheric C02 Stabilization Cases of the Four Al Baselines 
In the previous section we have illustrated the sensitivity of the magnitude of future 
GHG emissions and, hence, of possible climate change to rates and direction of future 
technology change in the energy sector. Based on current understanding, climate change 
implied especially by our high emission scenarios could be substantial and adverse to 
both humankind and natural ecosystems [27]. Hence, we explore alternative policy 
scenarios congruent with the stated objectives of the FCCC, that is, the "stabilization 
of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system." Because scientific uncertainty at 
present precludes an exact quantification of what a "dangerous" level would constitute, 
we perform a sensitivity analysis for a range of stabilization targets (derived from 
IPCC (27]) . 
POSSIBLE CO, MITIGATION STRATEGIES 
The largest anthropogenic contributor to global warming is C02• Strategies to 
stabilize the atmospheric C02 concentration may be based on technological change, or 
they may be based additionally on economic incentives and institutional frameworks. 
They range from using the carbon sequestering potential of afforestation to demand-
11 Numbers in the brackets show corresponding uncertainties due to carbon cycle uncert ainties. 
" Model parametrizations used to calculate CO, concentrations here are similar to those used by the 
IPCC in their Second Assessment Report [27]. 
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side or supply-side oriented measures in the energy sector and even so-called geo- and 
cosmo-engineering [12]. 11 
For simplicity. in this article we analyze atmospheric C02 concentration stabilization 
cases only and confine our discussion to CO, abatement measures in the energy sector 
(see the following section. Atmospheric CO, Stabilization Cases). 
In the energy sector. there are many types of technological strategies for stabilizing 
and eventually reducing energy-related emissions including. for example, the incremen-
tal replacement of power plants to improve energy efficiency. For example, energy end-
use is the least efficient part of the current energy systems and therefore has the highest 
potential for efficiency improvements [12. 14]. As illustrated over time in all Al baseline 
scenarios. this might. in the long run. also induce changes of technological trajectories 
··upstream" (e.g .. substitution of fuels using existing infrastructure) and eventually of 
the whole energy chain (e.g .. change of infrastructure from extraction to energy services). 
An example is the evolution of lifestyles and subsequent changes in energy use patterns 
that trigger corresponding changes in energy supply systems. 
A large number of strategies are often referred to as "add-on" e11vironme111al 
strategies. They include. for example, CO, removal by scrubbing and C02 recovery from 
flue gases. After recovery of C02 from the energy system, it has to be disposed of, 
stored or otherwise used . For example , in what is called enhanced oil recovery. C02 is 
injected in oil fields (originally to improve the oil recovery rate). C02 may be stored 
also in depleted natural gas and other underground reservoirs, eventually also in the 
deep ocean [28]. 
''The latter may be illustrated by the following consideration: About 10% of today's planet land area 
is activelv managed. To compensate for a rise in global temperatures by reflecting a fraction of the incoming 
solar radiation: an albedo change of about I% could compensate for about 1.000 GtC cumulative carbon 
emissions. Orbital shades might be as expensive as >$55/tC. but suborbital shades may be as cheap as >$Cl.I/ 
tC. However. environmental effects of such large-scale measures are completely unknown so far. 
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Original natural gas reserves in place correspond to a potential storage capacity of 
about 150 GtC. With the extraction of higher gas categories, this storage capacity may 
be larger than at least 250 GtC. In 1996 the IPCC estimated the potential storage 
capacity of depleted oil and gas fields alone to be as high as 500 GtC [27]. Deep 
subterranean sandstone aquifers have a longterm C02 storage capacity of about 90 GtC. 
C02 is also stored in chemical feedstocks and basic materials, for example, C02 is used 
in the synthesis of urea (> 10 MtC/year). A promising new method is the hydrocarb 
process [29] to produce methanol and carbon from biomass and fossil fuel with subse-
quent storage of carbon (very large volumes) in elemental form. A recent method 
developed by Steinberg [30] is the Carnol system. which consists of methanol production 
by CO, recovered from coal-fired power plants and natural gas, and the use of methanol 
as an alternative automotive fueJ. 1• By far the largest reservoir for carbon disposal in 
form of solid CO, ice is the deep ocean. which currently stores about 36.000 GtC. The 
global carbon cycle involves annual exchange of about 200 GtC between the oceans, 
the atmosphere, and the biosphere. compared to about 6 GtC emissions from fossil 
fuel production and use. 
ATMOSPHERIC CO: STABILIZATION CASES 
The scenarios described in this section were developed with MESSAGE. a bottom-
up energy systems model that incorporates mitigation technologies drawing on a technol-
ogy inventory. C02DB [21. 31. 32]. developed at IIASA. The inventory contains infor-
mation about technical characteristics of mitigation technologies, their cost structure, 
emissions, time horizon of their availability. etc. As explained in the previous section. 
we focus here on measures in the energy sector only. 
This section discusses the C02 abatement measures in the energy sector to achieve 
C02 stabilization by 2100. starting with the four A 1 baselines described earlier in the 
article. The stabilization levels have been set at 750. 650. 550. and 450 ppmv to facilitate 
comparison with the existing literature (see. e.g .. [33]). Technically. we perform illustra-
tive ""inverse calculations." imposing an atmospheric CO, concentration stabilization 
constraint (by 2100) on the energy model MESSAGE which then calculates the intertem-
poral optimum (cost minimum. discount rate 5%) for meeting the constraint. In [3] the 
sensitivity toward changes in discount rate as well as to different model representations 
of technological change were analyzed. Consistent with the consideration of climate 
change as a global. and long-term. environmental externality problem, we assume full 
temporal and spatial flexibility of mitigation measures. that is, the model is free to 
choose emission reduction when and where it is cheapest to do so. consistent with the 
global constraint. We separate the issue of "who mitigates" from the issue of "who pays 
for mitigation." For instance. the model calculations are consistent with the existence of 
a global ··carbon permit system." which internalizes the costs of the carbon externality 
into energy systems costs and. through global "permit" trading, could assure least cost 
implementation of emission reduction measures. Alternative emissions permit schemes 
that are likely to reflect the "common but differentiated responsibility" (FCCC, [4]) to 
the C02 externality were not analyzed for this article. A departure from the assumed 
temporal and spatial flexibility of emission reductions in the model would increase the 
costs of complying with a global C02 concentration target. Hence, our calculations 
"Carnol System CO, Reduction: \\'hen methanol is used in automotive internal combustion engines. a 
CO: reduction by 56 % compared to conventional system of coal plants and gasoline engines is achieved. and 
a CO, reduction by as much as 77 % when methanol is used in fuel cells in automotive engines [30]. 
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represent " least cost" solutions of dealing with a long-term global environmental issue, 
and these least cost solutions may be infeasible when facing political realities. 
Our result confirms the C02 emission pattern of stabilization cases discussed by 
Wigley, Richels, and Edmonds [33]: Global emissions rise initially, then pass through 
stabilization in order to decline in the second half of the 21st century (see Figure 3). 
Absolute emissions in 2100 for a given C02 concentration target differ due to different 
emissions paths up to 2100 (see Figure 3). The stabilization issue may be approximately 
viewed as a carbon budget allocation problem, and for each stabilization level there is 
roughly a fixed allowable amount of C02 to be released. In other words, given a particular 
stabilization target, cumulative carbon emission between 1990 and the year 2100 are 
limited, between roughly 740 GtC for 450 ppmv to 1,700 GtC for 750 ppmv. Figure 4 
shows the resulting atmospheric C02 concentrations. 
To achieve C02 stabilization at a given level, C02 abatement in the energy sector 
is mainly reached through a mix of "add-on" technologies (scrubbers) and structural 
change in energy supply and. hence, technologies used in the energy sector. C02 
scrubbers are an especially favored mitigation measure for the carbon-intensive baseline 
scenarios A1C and AlG (see Table 3). For the baseline scenarios A1B and A1T however, 
C02 abatement through structural change (i.e., change of energy technologies) is cheaper 
(see Table 3). The additional environmental constraint accelerates the aggregate rate 
of technological change already implicit in the scenario baseline. However, the share 
of scrubbing versus energy structural change is very sensitive to assumed scrubber 
costs. In particular for Al B and A 1 T, which assume considerable across-the-board 
technological progress, we also assume cost improvements for C02 scrubbers with 
increasing cumulative installations. Because of the large amounts of C02 scrubbed in 
stabilizing the high emission baselines AlG and A1C (see Table 3), estimates of C02 
disposal costs were included in the calculations. Towards 2100 and with increasing 
amounts of scrubbed C02 such as in the 450 ppmv stabilization cases of the coal baseline 
A1C (see Table 3). it may become more and more difficult to store the increasing 
amounts of C02 without unacceptable environmental impacts (see the section on Possi-
ble C02 Mitigation Strategies and Table 3). 
To achieve atmospheric C02 concentration stabilization, changes in the energy 
chains relative to the baselines are modeled on the level of individual technologies and 
in their ensemble of energy systems in MESSAGE. As explained below, changes occur 
mainly in the power generation sector and via a switching of energy fuels in the transport 
and the residential commercial sector. 
For the coal-intensive Al C baseline, C02 stabilization by 2100 is achieved mainly 
through scrubbing in the second half of the 21st century. Because of the high level of 
affluence in Al , the transport sector becomes the dominant final energy sector. In A1C, 
increased individual mobility leads to an increased demand for methanol synthesized 
from coal. This. in turn. leads to a per capita energy use level in transport by 2100 in 
all world regions that is comparable to the per capita energy use in transport in the 
United States in 1990. Therefore, scrubbing in the stabilization cases for the AlC 
baseline occurs to a large extent at the level of methanol synthetic fuel production in 
addition to scrubbing in coal high temperature fuel cells which is the most widely used 
power generation technology in the A1C scenarios. The lower the C02 stabilization 
target , the larger the amount of methanol that is substituted by H2 as a clean and 
carbon-free fuel. H2 is mainly produced from nuclear high temperature reactors and 
via coal gasificat ion and subsequent steam reforming of coal-based synthetic gas (with 
associated C02 capture and sequestration). Electricity demand is also satisfied increas-
TABLE 3 
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ingly through use of power generation with coal high temperature fuel cells, nuclear 
high temperature reactors. large wind/solar plants, and gas fuel cells. 
For the C02 stabilization of the oil and gas-intensive Al G baseline, scrubbing is 
nearly as dominant as for AlC, but it occurs on a different technology mix. Huge 
demands for oil and gas, driven by economic growth and technological progress in 
gas extraction and conversion technologies, will-among other trends-also lead to 
maximization of extraction amounts from oil and gas fields. In the past, on average, 
only 34% of in situ oil and 70% of natural gas were recovered with primary (drive 
from initial reservoir pressure) and secondary (e.g., water or gas injection to compensate 
for declining reservoir pressure) recovery methods [19]. In the future, a considerable 
fraction of the original in situ oil and gas may be recovered from both abandoned and 
existing fields with advanced production technologies, such as C02 injection for enhanced 
recovery of oil and gas [12]. Considerable C02 emission reductions are possible if the 
use of gas combined-cycle power plants is increasingly complemented with C02 injection 
back into the depleted natural gas reservoirs. In the following, we will call the whole 
process "gas reinjection." In the AlG stabilization scenarios, increasing electricity de-
mand is satisfied with ever more use of gas for electricity production. This is supple-
mented by increased H2 cogeneration. In the transport sector, ethanol substitutes the 
use of gas. The lower stabilization cases of AlG also rely on increased synfuel scrubbing. 
The importance of hydrogen production, mainly from natural gas and to some extent 
via coal gasification, increases. Additional drastic energy structural changes will be 
needed in the 22nd century in order to shift away from the reliance on gas, especially 
because capacity limits of gas reinjection will be reached (see the section on Possible 
C02 Mitigation Strategies). 
C02 stabilization of the balanced technology Al B baseline is achieved through a 
mix of C02 scrubbing and an acceleration of the scenario's inherent technology change 
dynamics toward nonfossil power generation and fuels. The lower the stabilization target, 
the larger the non fossil electricity generation. in particular, in the form of increased use 
of new types of nuclear power plants, hydrogen fuel cell-based transport technologies 
and some additional (higher cost) hydropower plants. In addition, in power generation, 
more coal fuel cells substitute advanced coal power plants, and gas reinjection substitutes 
gas combined cycles. The transport sector sees especially H2 (and electricity) as the 
main energy carrier instead of oil and gas. Most of this H2 is produced with renewable 
technologies such as solar thermal power plants. 
The rapid technological progress Al T baseline is so dynamic that it exhibits a C02 
stabilization of 560 ppmv by 2100 without specific additional C02 control measures. 
The technology change patterns to achieve stabilization at lower C02 concentrations 
are similar to those of the AlB stabilization cases, but lead further into the post-fossil 
era. All in all, AlT and lower stabilization cases thereof illustrate the evolution toward 
a hydrogen economy. Except for gas reinjection, all other fossil power generation 
technologies are substituted by nonfossil power plants . Coal plays virtually no role in 
power generation. Most important are an increased use of nuclear high temperature 
reactors (for H2 and electricity production) and hydrogen fuel cell-based transport 
(including decentralized off-hours electricity production). The dominating fuel in the 
transport sector and the residential commercial sector is H2, which is produced with 
nuclear high temperature reactors and renewable technologies such as solar thermal 
power plants . 
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Table 3 illustrates that in the fossil Al stabilization variants of AlC and AIG , 
large and increasing amounts of CO, are scrubbedY Energy structural change will have 
to be accelerated towards nonfossil technology use especially after 2100. which will be 
very expensive in the cases derived from A 1CandA1 G because of large-scale technologi-
cal lock-in in fossil-related technologies. 
All the variants discussed here. in their energy technological mix , depend to a 
varying but considerable extent on power generation from nuclear technologies. This 
ranges from worldwide application of rather conventional nuclear power plants in AlG , 
A 1C.andA1 B, to even high temperature nuclear reactors with large-scale H, production 
in AIT. 
Summary: Costs of C02 Abatement 
Figure 5 (and Table 3) illustrate cumulative traditional investment costs for the 
global energy system from 1990 to 2100. that is. the sum of investment costs. fixed and 
variable operation and maintenance costs. We include capital requirements for energy 
production capacities. for conversion and transformation facilities , for transmission and 
distribution infrastructures. and for complying with environmental standards. However, 
we do not include investments in end-use technologies, such as furnaces , appliances 
and vehicles. because they are traditionally counted as durable consumer goods or 
business investment (see also (34]) . Furthermore, we do not include investment require-
ments in R&D to achieve the assumed technology improvements in the scenarios. This 
is one of the reasons why the A 1 T baseline. which is very optimistic about technological 
progress in the end-use sector. seems almost like a "free lunch" (see Figure 5). Detailed 
1.< In the 22nd century thi s might in turn lead to serious CO, storage problems (see section on Possible 
CO, Mitigation Strategics). 
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investment projections for end-use technologies and "R&D effectiveness.'' however. 
are difficult. On the other hand. simplistic order of magnitude estimates for R&D 
investments (35] and end-use technologies (34] indicates that the differences between 
these additional expenses (not covered in our analysis here) for the baselines discussed 
here are smaller than the differences between the traditional energy investments. 
Total cumulative costs of the baseline scenarios and the respective atmospheric 
C01 concentration stabilization scenarios follow mainly from the assumed rates of 
technological progress. In increasing order of cumulative total costs, scenarios rank 
from A IT. A I B. A 1 G. to A lC. The total cumulative (1990-2100) costs for the baselines 
range by a factor close to two from about US$550 trillion (in 1990 prices) in AlT to 
US$940 trillion. The former being comparable to the global economic output of the 
A 1 scenario by the year 2100. Cumulative C02 reduction costs (i.e .. cost differences 
between baseline and respective stabilization scenarios) are lower than the cost differ-
ences from one baseline to another (see Figure 5). 
These cumulative costs translate into the following average cumulative mitigation 
costs in US$ per ton carbon removed (relative to the respective baseline scenario): 
• 750 ppmv: 25 $/tC for A 1G750. and 61 $/tC for A 1 C750 (zero in the other sce-
narios): 
• 650 ppmv: 19 $/tC for A 1 B650. 36 $/tC for A 1 G650. and 67 $/tC for A 1 C650: 
• 550 ppmv: 33 $/tC for A 1 B550. 45 $/tC for A I G550. and 93 $/tC for A 1 C550: 
• 450 ppmv: 43 $/tC for A 1 B-150. 5-1 $/tC for A I G-150. 182 $/tC for A 1T450. and 
258 $/tC for A I C-150. 
The CO, abatement costs of our calculations are of the same order of magnitude 
as those reported in the literature. For smaller CO, percentage cutbacks relative to the 
baselines. the CO, abatement costs discussed above are slightly lower but of the same 
order of magnitude as cost estimates from the GREEN m::idel (36]. the Edmonus and 
Barns model (37]. and for the DICE model [38. 39] . Emission reduction costs are. 
however. much lower in our MESSAGE runs for the larger C02 percentage cutbacks 
relative to the baselines compared to the literature (e.g .. [40]). due to the technology 
dynamics assumed in the MESSAGE runs. By and large this finding confirms earlier 
analysis (3] that cost differences for large percentage emission reductions are very 
sensi tive to the technology dynamics underlying the (unconstraint) baseline scenario. 
Reduct ion costs are generally highest for scenarios with static technology. 
The cumulative CO, abatement costs per ton carbon are highest in the coal ba.seline 
scenario AlC which is already the most expensive baseline in the Al scenario set. In 
other words. a lock-in in a coal- and synthetic fuel -intensive energy system in the 21st 
century not only yields the most expensive energy system, it also yields the highest 
costs of meeting alternative climate stabilization targets. 
How are these costs distributed over the time horizon from 1990 to 2100? Figure 
6 shows total a111111al system costs per unit final energy over time. (Specific costs are 
shown to take into account the different level of energy end-use efficiency in the A IT 
scenario compared to the other scenario variants. costs comparisons on absolute amounts 
are difficult to perform under appropriate ceteris paribus conditions.) Generally. costs 
per unit final energy increase in all cases until about 20-10. After 20-10. costs in A IT. 
A 1 B and Al G stay more or less constant. whereas those in A IC increase further at a 
similar pace as before. In all A I scenarios total global annual systems costs as percentage 
of GDP first increase from 5.5 % in 1990 to nearly 6% . and then decline to a lower 
percentage level until 2100. for example. to 2.7% of GDP in the AlB baseline case in 
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2100. Furthermore . the spread of total costs per final energy in 2100 is smaller than on 
average between 2040 and 2100, the reason of which lies in the dynamics of energy 
structural change. Consequently. this effect is highest in the rapid technological progress 
case AlT. 
Note that MESSAGE is a technology vintage model. that is. a maximum plant life 
is attributed to each technology. In this terminology, C02 abatement costs are due to 
the costs of add-on technologies. the premature retiring of capital stock, and cost 
differences between different technologies (e.g., a coal versus nuclear power plant). 
The capital stock for energy production and use is typically long-lived, on the order of 
30-40 years, which has important implications for investment decisions. New supply 
options typically take many years to enter the market. Therefore, total costs per unit 
energy are very similar in all A 1 cases discussed here until about 2020-2030. 16 
The regional differences of C02 abatement costs are very large. Short- to medium-
term mitigation costs are generally lower in developing and reforming economies than 
in today's OECD countries. This is due to the fact that developing and reforming 
economies today benefit from low labor costs and technological vintages that are rather 
inefficient. Potential efficiency gains are thus large. However, for developing countries, 
upfront capital investments are the dominant constraint, that is, global C02 abatement 
costs in the above cases are expected to be much larger if this problem of upfront 
investments in developing countries is not solved through measures such as technology 
transfer and investments from today's OECD countries. 
Uncertainties about future C02 abatement costs (and total system costs of the 
baseline) are very large. Nonetheless, a number of robust analytical findings emerge 
1
' An exception is the 450 ppmv CO, stabilization case for the coal-intensive A IC baseline. in which 
costly measures ha,·e to be taken from the start to achieve the stabilization goal within the given time frame. 
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fig. 7. Annual anthropogenic CH, emissions (in !\It). 
from our analysis. The central result is that the variation of total system costs over the 
A I baselines is larger than the variation of mitigation costs to achieve CO, concentration 
targets at alternative levels. The often seen practice of calculating an optimal tax on 
carbon under varying environmental constraints is heavily dependent on the rate and 
type of technological progress assumed for the scenario baseline. In other words, the 
'"cost effectiveness" of alternative pathways of technological change and the measures 
that could induce technological change in a particular direction are as important as the 
cost ··effectiveness'' of alternative long-term environmental targets. 
CONSEQUENCES OF CO, REDUCTION ON OTHER GHGs 
Reductions of different GHGs are not independent from each other. This section 
gives a short summary of effects of CO, reduction on methane and sulfur emissions in 
the stabilization cases described above. 
Metlwne Benefits of CO:c Reduction 
Figure 7 shows the reduction in global anthropogenic CH. emissions that are a 
direct consequence of CO, emissions reductions. Methane benefits as compared to total 
anthropogenic methane emissions are relatively small as the dominant methane emission 
source resides outside the energy sector (i .e., agricultural activities like livestock and 
rice paddies) . However. they are considerable within the energy sector (up to about 
20% ). Methane benefits are highest in the Al C coal scenario because the production 
of coal entails large methane emissions. With structural change away from coal due to 
a carbon constraint. methane emissions decrease also. 
Sulfur Benefits of CO! Reduction 
Except for the coal scenario A 1 C baseline. absolute S01 em1ss1on levels in all 
baseline scenarios are relatively low (see Figure 8) due to technological change. Even 
in the A 1 C scenario. SO, emissions are much lower than in '"business-as-usual scenarios" 
reported in the literature (for a review see [41]). This is due to two factors: First. the 
high income characteristics of all Al baseline scenarios put an additional premium on 
local and regional air quality (and, hence . sulfur controls to combat urban air pollution 
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and acid rain ): second. the high technology dynamics assumed for all baseline scenarios 
that either result in continued structural change of energy systems. or the diffusion of 
clean technologies concerning traditional pollutants. Advanced coal technologies are 
thus much less sulfur emission intensive irrespective of whether the carbon externality 
is factured in the analysis or not. From that perspective. traditional '"business-as-usual'' 
environmental scenarios of high sulfur am! carbon emissions imply extrapolating the 
current technological state of the art and valuation of local and regional air quality 
very far into the future. Sulfur benefits of CO, reduction are particularly high both for 
the rapid technological progress baseline scenario A IT and. due to the requirement of 
prior desulfurization when CO, scrubbers are used. for the high carbon control scenarios 
of the coal-intensive baseline scenario A 1 C. Just as with methane. sulfur benefits of 
CO, controls are largest in the developing countries (e.g .. the coal-rich economies 
of Asia). 
CLIMATIC IMPACTS: RADIATIVE FORCING. TEMPERATURE CHANGE. AND 
SEA LEVEL RISE 
What are the environmental consequences of selecting one concentration or emis-
sion trajectory over another? Standard indicators of the extent of climate impacts are 
radiative forcing. and. consequently. global mean temperature change and possible sea 
level rise (see. e.g .. [27] and [38. 39]). 
To estimate possible climate effects of the various A 1 baselines and their respective 
CO, stabilization cases. the climate model MAG ICC (version 2.3) developed by Wigley 
[26] was used . The latest model version supports regionalized (three world regions) 
SO, emissions input data. which are important to calculate the regionally different 
cooling effect of sulfate aerosols. For radiative forcing we use the latest parameterizations 
reported in [42] . The other model input parameters for MAGGICC used here are 
similar to those used by the IPCC in the Second Assessment Report [27] . 
For all scenarios described in this article. estimations for the entire suite of direct 
and indirect GHG emissions were made including CO,. CH,, N,O. SO,. CFC/HFC/ 
HCFC. PFC. SF11 • CO. VOCs and NOx. Non-energy-sector emissions were estimated 
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using corresponding land use change model runs with equivalent input assumptions 
from the AIM model (see the contributions of Morita et al. and Riahi et al. in this 
issue). Halocarbon emissions are based on the scenarios developed by Fenhann (this 
issue) . Figure 9 illustrates total radiative forcing due to all these gases relative to 1990. 
In the year 2100 total radiative forcing shows a large range 17 (Figure 9) from 2.5 W/m2 
to 6.7 W/m2• Up to about the year 2040. however, total radiative forcing is nearly 
identical for the scenarios A lB, AlG. and AlT (Figure 9). This is due to the combined 
inertia of the energy system and the climate system, and a balancing effect of sulfur 
emissions. The more rapid the technological progress assumed for a baseline, the lower 
the C01 emissions and the lower the scenario's sulfur emissions. Decreasing sulfur 
emissions (Figure 8), however, enhance radiative forcing and GHG-induced warming. 
whereas decreasing CO, emissions decrease radiative forcing. These two effects counter-
balance each other until C01 emissions start differing substantially among the different 
scenarios and SO, emissions have reached a very low level (from which not much further 
sulfur reduction is possible) . In contrast to the other baselines. the coal intensive baseline 
A 1 C experiences first a doubling of S02 emissions until 2040 and an eventual decline 
(Figure 8) . Until 2090 this produces a strong negative radiative forcing (or cooling) 
effect in Al C (summing direct and indirect effects of S04• see Figure 10). As a conse-
quence. total radiative forcing for Al C until about 2040 is lower than in the other cases, 
although C02 emissions in the AlC baseline are highest of all Al variants. 
Decreasing S02 emissions for A 1 B, A 1 G , and A 1 T scenarios are a common charac-
teristic comparable to other scenarios described in this issue (see, e.g., Riahi and Roehr! 
in this issue). In this respect our scenarios differ markedly from the IPCC IS92 scenario 
series. This difference has also important consequences on a regional level. A regional 
analysis of climate warming with a simple regionalized climate/ocean model (Schlesinger 
" Total radiative forcing in the year 2100 reaches 2.5-2.9 W lm' in the 450 ppmv stabilization cases: 3.6-3.8 
\Vim' in AlT and the 550 ppmv stabilization cases: 4.4-4.7 W lm' in the 650 ppmv cases: 5.0 W lm' in AlB: 
5.5-5.7 \Vim' in the 750 ppmv cases: 6.1 W lm' in AIG: and 6.7 \Vim' in AIC. 
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et al.. in this issue) shows that reduction in regional SO, in A 1 results in a significant 
warming of Europe. Asia. and North America. 
Global mean temperature change (see Figure 11) shows the same pattern as radia-
tive forcing. If we use a "best guess"' climate sensitivity of 2.5°C (i.e .. 2.5°C warming 
for a doubling of atmospheric C0 2 levels [27]). we estimate global mean temperature 
to change until the year 2100 by about l .4-1.5°C in the 450 ppm CO, stabilization 
scenarios. 1.9°C in the 550 ppm stabilization scenarios. 2.2°C in the 650 ppm stabilization 
scenarios. and 2.6°C in the 750 ppm stabilization scenarios. However. the climate sensitiv-
ity parameter is highly uncertain. Often lower bounds for climate sensitivity parameters 
of l .5°C and higher bounds of 4.5°C [27] are suggested. which would change our results 
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dramatically. 1' The resulting error bar for the AlC baseline in the year 2100 is from 
2. l. to 4.1 °C with a .. best guess" of 3.0°C: that is. this range for the A 1 C baseline 
alone is of the same order of magnitude as the range of best guesses for all the A 1 
scenarios combined. 
Figure 12 shows .. best guess" global mean sea level rise trajectories. They were 
calculated with the MAGG IC model using intermediate model parameterizations. Inter-
estingly. due to the time lag between radiative forcing and sea level rise the largest sea 
level rise within the time frame of 1990-2100 is expected for the oil and gas-intensive 
AlG scenario with 59 cm in the year 2100 relative to 1990, although radiative forcing 
in 2100 in A I G is lower than in A 1 C. The lowest is the 450 ppmv C02 stabilization 
case AlC450 for the coal-intensive baseline which shows a 39 cm sea level rise by the 
year 2100. 
Note that climate model uncertainties are very large. in particular the uncertainty 
of sea level rise for a particular radiative forcing . This uncertainty range (due to low 
and high estimates of sea level model parameters) for the AlB baseline scenario alone 
is 23-95 cm with a ''best guess'' of 55 cm in expected sea level rise in the year 2100. 
This is larger than the range of best guesses over afl Al scenarios (39-59 cm in the 
year 2100) (Figure 12) . 
Implications and Conclusion 
In this article. we explored the relationship between long-term technology develop-
ment in the energy sector and the possible magnitude of long-term climate change with 
scenarios. Embracing a dynamic perspective of technological change illustrates the 
sensitivity of projected future G HG emission levels to alternative developments in 
energy sector technologies. By exploring alternative development pathways of techno-
1
' The ra ng.es for Al scenarios in thi s article are IA to 3.0' C for a climate sensitivity of 2.S' C: 0.9 to 2.l ' C 
for a climate sensiti\'ity o f I.5' C: and 2.1 to -1. l' C for a climate sensitivity of 4.5' C. 
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logical change consistent both with historical evidence and concepts of path dependent 
technological change, a wide range of future GHG emissions and, hence, climate change 
outcomes are possible. In fact , the range of emissions that results from varying technolog-
ical developments within a single scenario family (the high growth SRES Al scenario) 
is as large as the range of emissions spanned by the entire range of SRES scenarios 
exploring the uncertainty of demographic, economic as well as environmental policy 
developments of the 21st century. Because of uncertainties in technological change, 
future GHG emissions could range from very high levels (four times larger than at 
present) to comparatively low levels (about the same as today), even in absence of 
climate policies. Therefore, we conclude that uncertainties in technological change are 
as important for future GHG emissions and. hence , climate change as uncertainties in 
long-term demographic and economic developments. This may be not be news to the 
readers of this journal, but it is an important conclusion for climate policy analysis 
which has so far devoted insufficient attention to the dynamics of technological change. 
Technological change is also a paramount determinant of future energy costs, for 
lowering future costs of complying with climate control targets, and for the realization 
of synergies between various GHG emission reduction measures. Embracing a cost 
benefit framework for climate change policy analysis means we have to consider the 
inherent uncertainties in cost differences of underlying baseline scenarios. We have 
shown that these baseline cost differences are larger than the cost differences of meeting 
alternative climate stabilization targets. This leads to two important methodological 
and policy conclusions. First , improved future models should treat technologies and 
technological change as uncertain, should include initial upfront R&D costs of new 
technologies in the cost analysis. and finally should include estimates of end-use sector 
investments. Second. considering the Jong-term nature of the climate change problem 
and its inherent uncertainties (precise targets cannot be established at present). climate 
policies perhaps need to be extended to include technology policy. 
According to our calculations. a coal-based synthetic fuel economy scenario has 
both the highest overall energy systems costs as well as the highest costs of complying 
with climate policy targets. which illustrates the need to avoid a premature "lock-
in" in such a pathway of long-term technological change. Scenarios of accelerated 
technological change might require long-term RD&D commitment in new energy tech-
nologies. upfront investments and accumulation of experience in niche markets. This 
requires both long-term perspectives as well as long-term policy orientations rather 
than a focus on short-term emission reduction targets. Preferences between scenario 
alternatives will be also based on other factors , for example, the relative desirability or 
undesirability of the large materials handling requirements of massive C02 sequestration 
and its possible environmental impacts in case of a coal-intensive scenario, preferences 
between "upstream" and "downstream" RD&D. the acceptability of alternatives such 
as nuclear power, and the relative priority given by different nations to energy security. 
An important finding from our scenario exercise is that even in scenarios of path-
dependent technological change favoring fossil fuels, the long-term technology portfolio 
needs to include improvements in nuclear, renewables, and gas-related technologies 
and infrastructures. Innovative "transitional" strategies of using natural gas as a "bridge" 
toward a carbon-free hydrogen economy (including C02 sequestration) are also at a 
premium in a possible carbon constrained future world. These are obvious priority 
candidates for enhanced RD&D efforts, with particular emphasis on their applicability 
for developing countries. the dominant source of energy-related C02 emissions in the 
long term . Such a technology policy response appears especially meaningful for applying 
258 R. A. ROEHRL AND K. RIAHI 
the precautionary principle under persistent and large uncertainties with respect to 
timing and magnitude of climate change and its impacts. 
Yet, the valuation of local and regional environmental quality in an affluent world 
is likely to lead to accelerated control of sulfur emissions, which could amplify possible 
climate change. Important tradeoffs are therefore likely to persist for environmental 
policy throughout the 21st century. Accelerated technological change can widen the 
response portfolio in the face of multiple long-term contingencies. But tough decisions 
need to be addressed: whether to focus on short-term local and regional environmental 
issues or on long-term climate change, such as focusing resources on meeting short-
term carbon limits as exemplified by the Kyoto Protocol versus expanding response 
options for meeting (perhaps tougher) long-term targets through accelerated technologi-
cal change. Informing policymakers about the importance and inherent uncertainties 
of technological change as well as improving its treatment in models and scenario studies 
remain important objectives for the analytical community. For society at large it means 
understanding (and accepting) that we need more technology and not less in responding 
to long-term environmental challenges. 
Appendix: Al "StoQ·Iine"-A Narrative Description 
The Al storyline is a short narrative description of the main characteristics of the 
A 1 scenario family developed by the international team featured in this issue. 19 It serves 
as a main background document for the scenario quantifications using formal models 
reported in this article and is reproduced in abridged form here: 
The Al storyline is a case of rapid and successful economic development. in which regional averages of 
income per capita converge: current distinctions between ··poor"" and ""rich·· countries eventually dissolve. 
The primary dynamics are a strong commitment to market-based solutions: high savings and commitment 
to education at the household level: high rates of investment and innovation in education. technology. 
and institutions at the national and international level: and international mobility of people. ideas. and 
technology. The transition to economic convergence results from advances in transport and communica-
tion technology. shifts in national policies on immigration and education. and international cooperation 
in the development of national and international institutions that enhance productivity growth. technology 
innovation. and diffusion. 
In the Al scenario family. demogrnphic and economic trends are closely linked. as affluence is correlated 
with long life and small families (low mortality and low fertility) . Global population grows to some nine 
billion by 2050 and declines to about seven billion by 2100. A\'erage age increases. with the needs of 
retired people met mainly through their accumulated savings in private pension systems. 
The global economy expands at an average annual rate of about 3% to 2100. This is approximately the 
same as average global growth since 1850. although the conditions that lead to this global economic 
growth in productivity and per capita incomes in the scenario are unparalleled in history. Global income 
per capita reaches about US$21.000 by 2050. While the high average level of income per capita contributes 
to a great improvement in the overall health and social conditions of the majority of people. this world 
is not necessarily devoid of problems. In particular. many communities could face some of the problems 
of social exclusion encountered by the wealthiest countries in the 20th century. and in many places 
income growth could come with increased pressure on the global commons. 
Energy and mineral resources are abundant in this scenario family because of rapid technical progress. 
which both reduce the resources needed to produce a gi,·en level of output and increases the economically 
recoverable reserves. Final energy intensity (energy use per unit of GDP) decreases at an average annual 
rate of 1.3%. 
" The original version of the A I storyline was created by Arnulf Griibler. a member of the abovc-
mentioned international team. 
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The Al marker scenario is based on a balanced mix of primary energy sources and has an intermediate 
level of CO, emissions. but depending on the energy sources developed. emissions in the Al scenario 
variants cover a very wide range. In the fossil-fuel-intensive variants. emissions approach those of the 
A2 scenarios of the SRES scenario set: conversely. in variants with low labor productivity or of rapid 
progress in "post-fossil" energy technologies. emissions are intermediate between those of the B 1 and 
B2 scenarios (see Bert de Vries et al.. and Riahi and Roehr!. in this issue). 
Ecological resilience is assumed to be high. Environmental amenities are valued and rapid technological 
progress "frees" natural resources currently devoted to provision of human needs for other purposes. 
The concept of environmental quality changes in this storyline from current emphasis on "conservation" 
of nature to active "management" of natural and environmental services. 
With the rapid increase in income. dietary patterns shift initially toward increased consumption of meat 
and dairy products. but may decrease subsequently with increasing emphasis on health of an aging society. 
High incomes also translate into high car ownership. sprawling suburbanization. and dense transport 
networks. nationally and internationally. 
Al Variants: Several variant scenarios have been considered in the AI scenario family that reflect the 
uncertainty in development of energy sources and conversion technologies in this rapidly changing 
world. Some of the variants evolve along the carbon-intensive energy path consi.stent with the current 
development strategy of countries with abundant domestic coal resources. Other variants intensify the 
dependence on oil. and in the longer run. natural-gas resources. The third group envisages a stronger 
shift toward renewable energy sources and. conceivably. also nuclear energy. The implications of these 
alternative development paths for future GHG emissions are challenging: The emissions vary from the 
carbon-intensive to decarbonization paths by at least as much as across the variation of all other driving 
forces across the other three scenario families. 
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